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Congressional Sanction of Illicit
Cohabitation-The Tax Reform Act of 1969
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Tax Reform Act of 1969 Congress lowered t,he income
tax rates for unmarried individuals in an attempt to reduce the
disparity between the amount of taxes paid by a single person and
the amount paid by a married couple with the same total income.' By the enactment of this statute, Congress inadvertently
created what has been called the "marriage penalty."
The marriage penalty is the amount of tax a married couple
must pay, using the rates applicable to married persons, over that
which they would pay if they were allowed to compute their tax
individually using the rate tables for single persons. Where only
one spouse works outside the home, the penalty is nonexistent.
But where both spouses are employed and earn approximately
equal incomes, the penalty is imposed, affecting both low- and
high-income couples and increasing as both spouses' incomes increase.*
This development has caused a substantial outcry among
those affected. Opponents of the legislation accuse Congress of
subsidizing those couples who choose to live together without the
benefit of matrimony and complain that it causes both an increase in the divorce rate and a breakdown in the marriage relationship.
This Comment traces the history of tax law in this area,
analyzes the controversy as it exits today, discusses the constitutionality of the rate structure, and suggests potential alternatives
to the present rate structure.
1. See STAFFOF THE JOINT
C O M M ~
ONEINTERNAL
REVENUE
TAXATION,
91s~
CONC.,
GENERAL
EXPLANATION
OF THE TAXREFORM
ACT OF 1969, a t 223 (Comm. Print 1970). The

reasons given for the change in the single person rate table were that
[ulnder prior law, the tax rates imposed on single persons were quite heavy
relative to those imposed on married couples a t the same income level; a t some
income levels a single person's tax was as much as 42.1 percent higher than the
tax paid on a joint return with the same amount of taxable income. . . . [The
new] rate schedule is designed to provide tax liabilities for single persons which
are 17 to 20 percent above those for married couples . . . with the maximum
differential of 20 percent . . . . Id. a t 223.
& J. PECHMAN,
FEDERAL
TAXREFORM,
THE IMPOSSIBLE
DREAM?
34 (1975).
2. G. BREAK
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The History

Prior to 1948 everyone was taxed according to individual in. ~ change in this practice
come, irrespective of marital ~ t a t u sThe
,~
acwas precipitated by the decision in Poe v. S e a b ~ r nwhich
corded more favorable tax treatment to married taxpayers living
in community property states than to married taxpayers living in
non-community property states.
In Poe the Court held that in community property states a
married couple could file separate tax returns, each reporting
one-half of total marital income. Where only one spouse earned
income, each spouse could report one-half of the total and thus
pay a lower combined income tax because of the lower marginal
rates. This concept is known as "income-splitting."
Because of the benefits that income-splitting provided, many
states adopted community property laws. To achieve geographical tax equity and thus neutralize Poe, Congress amended the
Internal Revenue Code in 1948, allowing all married couples to
file joint returns. The rates for married couples filing jointly were
set at one-half the rates for single persons at each income level,
eliminating the tax advantage of living in a community property
~tate.~
As a result of this change, a single taxpayer earning the same
income as a married couple was required to pay a substantially
higher amount of taxes than the married couple. In some cases
the disparity exceeded forty percent? Congress finally altered this
situation in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. For taxpayers with incomes between $14,000 and $100,000, the new single person rate
table established a tax liability for single taxpayers a t no more
than twenty percent above the liability for a married couple a t
the same income level? The Act requires married couples to either file a joint return or, if they file separate returns, to use a
3. Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 899 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046
(1978). See also Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both
Spouses are Working: Hearings before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 60-61 (1972) (statement of Albert H. Turkus) [hereinafter cited as 1972
Hearings].
4. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
5. See Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896,899 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046
(1978); 1972 Hearings, supra note 3, at 60-61 (statement of Albert H. Turkus).
6. S. REP. NO. 552, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 260 (1969), reprinted in INTERNAL REVENUE
HISTORY
1966-1970, at 1639, 1909 (West 1971).
ACTS:TEXTAND LEGISLATIVE
7. Id.
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table composed of rates set a t twice the joint return rate a t all
income levels, thus providing no tax incentive for a married couple to file separate returns."
The net effect of these provisions is the marriage penalty.
Because the rates for single persons are now less than twice the
rates for married couples filing a joint return, and because married couples can no longer file separate returns and use the single
person rate tables, a married couple earning approximately
equivalent incomes pay more tax than they would if they were
unmarried .g

B. The Controversy
The economic effects of the marriage penalty are best illustrated by Table':1 which shows the dollar amount of the penalty
at various income levels.
TABLE1-1976 Marriage Penalty by Income Compensations
Husband's
Adjusted
Gross
Income
Zero

1

2,m
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
20,ooo

Wife's' Adjusted Gross Income
Zero

2,000

Zero
Zero

Zero

-177
-248
-319
-405
-458
-486
-625
-787
-932

54
121
91
61
- 13
- 40
-123
-190
-287
-382

All calculations assume that each taxpayer elects the standard deduction. Computations do not
include the 1976 General Tax credit. A minus sign indicates a tax reduction.

8. Id. See also Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 899 (Ct. ~ l : ) ,cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1046 (1978).
9. Two less significant factors also play a role in the marriage penalty. These factors
arise because of the provision that a married couple must either file a joint return or use
the special rate schedule for married persons filing separately.
The first factor is the standard deduction. I.R.C. 5 63(d). The standard deduction,
or zero bracket amount as it is now called, is significantly less for a married couple than
for two individuals filing as single persons. This zero bracket amount is currently $3300
for married persons filing jointly. ($1650 for married persons filing separately) and $2300
for single persons. Thus,two single individuals are allowed to deduct $4500 as a standard
deduction whereas a married couple may only deduct $3300.
The second factor is the general tax credit. I.R.C. 5 42 provides for a credit of two
percent of taxable income up to $9000, or $35 times each exemption claimed by the
taxpayer, whichever is greater. Unless the taxpayer claims more than five exemptions, the
maximum credit is $180. The IRS maintains that a married couple is entitled to only one
$180 credit even if both taxable incomes are above $9000. Mapes v. United States, 576
F.2d 896, 899 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
10. Table 1is derived from a chart in Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896,905 (Ct.
1 , cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
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The criticism most often voiced against the current rate
structure is that the marriage penalty encourages couples to live
together without the benefit of matrimony, and encourages married couples to obtain a divorce. One emotional appeal stated:
[Tlhe whole institution of marriage has been gravely threatened by the recent changes in the income tax laws. By making
it so profitable to "live together in sin", the Federal Government
has virtually rocked-the foundation of marriage. Many of those
who understood the impact of the change in the tax laws obtained divorces last year. Many more will get divorces this year,
unless the marriage tax is repealed.
. . . Those who got their divorces before last year's tax
deadline plead for a way to be able to live together, married,
without having to pay thousands of dollars for the right.
Many other members are wrestling with their religious convictions, and finding it difficult to believe that the Government
is actually taxing their union before God."

The controversy has been fueled by the proliferation in the
number of working wives. According to one author:
The tax laws were given their present form a t a time when it was
considered normal for the husband to work and the wife to remain a t home. At present, the majority of married couples are
both earners, and it is no longer appropriate to treat the oneearner couple as the norm.12

A 1978 Duke University study states that "[iln the twenty year
period from 1956 to 1976, the labor force participation of married
women doubled by rising from 11 million to 22 million."13The
study also notes that
50% of all women are in the labor force, and . . . now make up
42%of all U.S. workers. . . . Complete figures for the year 1976
show that out of nearly 47 million families headed by a husbandwife couple 22 million of the wives were on the labor market. . . . In fact, less than one-quarter of American families of
11. 1972 Hearings, supra note 3, at 125 (statement of Britten D. Richards, Executive
Director, National Association of Married Working Couples). See also id. at 41 (statement
of Christine Beshar, representing the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Committee on Sex and Law).
12. G. BREAK
& J. PECHMAN,
supra note 2, at 34.
13. Z.I. Giraldo, Tax Policy and the Dual Income Family: The "Marriage Tax" and
Other Inequities 1-1 (1978) (available from Center for the Study of the Family and the
State, Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs, Duke University).
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four rely solely on t h e wages of t h e male head-ofhousehold. . . .I4

Thus, forty-four million taxpayers were to some extent affected
by the marriage penalty in 1976.
According to a press release issued by Senator Charles Mathias, sponsor of a bill currently before the Senate that proposes
to eliminate the marriage penalty:
Five years ago, a t least 13 million "two-earner couples"
were penalized, paying a marriage tax of approximately $2 billion to the government. Nearly all these couples had combined
incomes of less than $50,000. Now, the Internal Revenue Service
estimates that more than half of all taxpayers are married, and
that a t least half of all married couples are two-earner couples.
That means that as many as one-quarter of the taxpayers in the
United States might be victims of the tax on marriage.15

Some couples have attempted to circumvent the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 by obtaining a "temporary divorce." A married couple
could obtain a divorce just before the close of the taxable year,
usually in a foreign jurisdiction to avoid the'strict divorce laws
still prevalent in many American jurisdictions, and then remarry
shortly after the yearend. Thus, they would be "single" a t the
close of the taxable year, which, under the present tax law,16 is
the date when marital status is determined for the entire taxable
year. The Commissioner attempted to end this practice by issuing Revenue Ruling 76-255." According to the ruling, such divorces are only intended to be effective for tax purposes. They are
"sham transactions" and the parties are not "single" within the
meaning of the Code.
The impact of the marriage penalty on the rapidly changing
social and moral structure of the American family is presently
unknown. But even if one disregards the "living in sin" argument,
one cannot escape the fact that the penalty has had a significant
economic impact on married couples.

In. CONSTITUTIONALITY
The tax rate structure of the Internal Revenue Codel"as
survived two recent constitutional attacks based upon the effects
14. Id.
15. Press Release by Senator Charles McC. Mathias (June 28, 1979).
16. I.R.C. § 143.
17. 1976-2C.B.40.
18. I.R.C. § 1.
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of the marriage penalty. In deciding each of these cases, however, the respective courts did not apply consistent standards of
review.
In Mapes v. United Stateslothe court rejected the arguments
in favor of a heightened standard of review and applied the deferential standard usually associated with taxing statutes-rational
basis.20On the other hand, in Johnson v. Unites state^,^' the court
found a significant burden on plaintiff's fundamental right to
marry and on their fundamental rights of privacy and associathe strict scrutiny, or compelling state intert i ~ nand
, ~ applied
~
est, standard of review? Although the two courts applied different standards of review, they both upheld the statutory scheme,
the Mapes court finding a rational basis for the scheme, and the
Johnson court a compelling state interest.

A.
1.

The Application of Strict Scrutiny

The fundamental right to marry

a. Background. The Supreme Court recognized as early as
1923, in Meyer v. N e b r a ~ k athat
, ~ ~ the right to marry was pro19. 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U S . 1046 (1978).
20. The rational basis standard that is normally applied to taxing statutes is an
extremely deferential one and its application almost always results in the statute being
held valid. This standard creates a presumption of the statute's validity and places a
heavy burden on the individual to demonstrate that the statute is not rationally related
to a legitimate state purpose. No taxing statute subjected to this standard has ever been
found unconstitutional.
21. 422 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Barter v. United States, 550
F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978).
22. The fundamental right to marry has generally been associated with the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, whereas the right to privacy is associated
with the due process clause. Thus it is important to distinguish between the two clauses
when raising these constitutional issues. This Comment, however, will discuss the general
application of strict scrutiny versus rational basis and the relationship of these tests to
the fundamental rights involved, without probing which fundamental right goes with
which clause. This treatment is adequate because once a fundamental right has been
found to have been violated, the strict scrutiny test applies, regardless of whether the
specific fundamental right is protected under the equal protection clause or under the due
process clause. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). The application of the strict scrutiny standard almost always results in the statute
in question being held unconstitutional. A presumption of invalidity of the statute arises
when this standard is applicable, and a heavy burden is placed on the government to show
that it has a compelling state interest for keeping the statute in force.
23. Various other arguments were raised for the application of strict scrutiny, but
were summarily dismissed by the court. These other arguments consisted of sex discrimination and invasion of the plaintiffs' right to freely practice their religion. These arguments do not appear particularly meritorious and will not be discussed here.
24. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
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tected under the aegis of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee
of due process of law. Later the Court noted, "Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race. "25
More recently, the constitutional right to marry has been
articulated under the banner of the right of privacy,26receiving
greater support than ever before. This newest phase of constitutional protection of marital rights had its genesis in 1965 in
Griswold v. C o n n e ~ t i c u tIn
. ~ that
~ case, the Court struck down a
Connecticut law that forbade the use of contraceptives by married couples. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, declared
that certain provisions of the Bill of Rights created penumbras of
constitutional protection that, although not specifically enumerated in t h e Bill of Rights, must be recognized because
"[w]ithout those peripheral rights the specific rights would be
less secure. "28
Griswold held that the marriage relationship lies within a
"zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantee^."^ Justice Douglas stated:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
It is not an association that promotes a way of life, not causes;
a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet, it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.30

The Court, finding that the state was seeking to achieve its goals
by means having a "maximum destructive impact" upon the
marriage relationship, held the statute uncon~titutional.~~
(1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510, 520 (1925).
25. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (emphasis added). See generally
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
26. The right of privacy has developed in the following cases: Lanza v. New York,
370 U.S. 139 (1962); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,656 (1961); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
516-22 (1961); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,36573 (1959); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 463-66 (1952); Breard v. City
of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
27. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28. Id. a t 482-83.
29. Id. a t 485.
30. Id. a t 486.
31. It is difficult, a t best, to determine from Griswold when the right of marital
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In Loving v. Virginia" the Supreme Court struck down a
Virginia miscegenation statute, finding a violation of both the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court found that the statute invidiously discriminated on the basis of race and infringed upon plaintiffs'
fundamental right to marry. The Court noted: "The freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our
very existence and s ~ r v i v a l . "Numerous
~~
decisions have cited
Loving for this propostition," but because it was difficult to determine how much reliance Loving had placed on the right to
marry, as opposed to the finding of racial discrimination, the
right to marry was not firmly established.
Two recent cases finally accomplished this task. In Zablocki
v. Redhail," the Court squarely held that the right to marry is a
constitutionally protected right. Zablocki is also important because, in distinguishing a case decided only two months earlier,
Caiifano v. J ~ b s t , ~ V hCourt
e
formulated the test to determine
under what circumstances the right to marry is violated. The
Court held that state action must "significantly interfere" with
the right to marry before it will be subjected to strict scrutiny.
In Zablocki a Wisconsin statute requiring noncustodial fathers to pay all of their arrearages in child support before marrying was declared unconstitutional. The statute required the father to appear before a court and show that all such arrearages
had been paid before the court would grant the necessary permission to marry.
privacy has been violated because no specific test appears to have surfaced from that
decision. Although Justice Douglas used the words "maximum destructive impact," it is
certainly arguable that something less than that may be required. The "significant interference" test that surfaced in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U S . 374 (1978), may be enough to
show a constitutional infringement in this context also. See notes 35-39 and accompanying
text infra. First, it can be argued that the right to marry and the right to remain married
are indistinguishable-because they have the same constitutional status, their infringement should be subjected to the same test. Second, the right to marry and the right to
marital privacy have often been discussed in the same context and have become so interwoven that some courts have treated them as identical rights.
32. 388 U S . 1 (1967).
33. Id. a t 12 (emphasis added).
34. See, e . g , Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U S . 113, 152 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U S . 371, 376 (1971). See also
Paul v. Davis, 424 U S . 693, 713 (1976); Turner v. Department of Employment Security,
423 U S . 44, 46 (1975); ,United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 438 (1973).
35. 434 U S . 374 (1978).
36. 434 U S . 47 (1977).
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In Jobst the Court rejected a constitutional attack on sections of the Social Security Act providing for termination of a
dependent child's benefits upon marriage to an individual not
entitled to benefits under the Act. The Court found no infringement of plaintiff's right to marry, because the rule requiring termination of benefits upon marriage was not "an attempt to interfere with the individual's freedom to make a decision as important as marriage.""
Neither Zablocki nor Jobst can escape criticism. Zablocki
distinguished Jobst by finding that the operation of the statute
in Jobst was not a significant interference with the plaintiff's
freedom to marry while the operation of the statute in Zablocki
was. This distinction is questionable because the Zablocki Court
was relying on a footnote in Jobst that stated that the plaintiff's
federal benefit payments actually decreased by only twenty dollars per month because of the availability, due to his marriage,
of other benefits. The Court compared this twenty dollars per
month decrease in benefits to the statutory scheme in Zablocki
that required a certain class of Wisconsin residents to obtain
court permission to marry. Court permission was granted only if
the party showed he had satisfied all his child support obligations.
The cost of marriage in Jobst, however, was potentially
higher than the twenty dollars per month that the plaintiff in
Jobst was forced to forego. These two cases appear to be effectively doing the same thing, precluding an individual from marrying because of financial consideration^.^'
In Jobst the Court rested its rejection of the fundamental
right argument upon the finding that the Social Security Act was
not an "attempt" to interfere with anyone's decision to marry.
Whether the Act was an attempt a t interference, however, is irrelevant. The statute in Zablocki was an attempt to force fathers to
support their children, not to prevent those fathers from marrying. The effect, of course, was to prevent them from marrying, as
was the effect, to a lesser degree, in Jobst. But it was that effect
which the Zablocki Court declared unconstitutional.
Many [persons], able in theory to satisfy the statute's requirements, will be sufficiently burdened by having to do so that
37. Id. at 54.
38. The Court of Claims in Mapes read the Jobst and Zablocki opinions together to
establish a rule that the right to marry is not violated unless the interference "operates
to preclude marriage entirely for a certain class of people." 576 F.2d at 901. This reading
is not totally correct and will later be discussed.
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they will in effect be coerced into foregoing their right to marry.
And even those who can be persuaded to meet the statute's
requirements suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of
choice in an area in which we have held such freedom to be
f~ndamental.~~

I t is unclear how the significant interference test will ultimately be applied: How significant must the interference be before it will be declared unconsitutional? The facts in Zablocki
were such that the plaintiff could have been totally precluded
from marrying, yet the language of the Court indicates that something less than total preclusion constitutes a significant interference.
b. Analysis. Both Mapes and Johnson involved constitutional attacks by married persons upon the tax rate structures.
In both cases plaintiffs alleged that the rate structure infringed
on their fundamental rights of marriage and privacy. Although
the two courts applied different standards of review, they both
upheld the contitutionality of the tax rate structure. The Mapes
court justified its action by applying the rational basis test, while
the Johnson court, although applying strict scrutiny, justified its
action by finding a compelling state interest. The court in Mapes
read Zablocki and Jobst together to stand for the proposition that
"the application of strict scrutiny is appropriate only where the
obstacle to marriage is a direct one; i.e., one that operates to
preclude marriage entirely for a certain class of people, as in
Za blocki. This conclusion is not entirely correct.
The statute in Zablocki did not totally preclude all persons
in the class4' from marrying in all cases. The only persons actually
precluded from marrying were those who could not meet their
support obligations for minor children not in their custody. Those
who could meet their support obligations were not precluded from
marrying but, as the Court stated, their right to marry was still
"sufficiently burdened [so that] . . . in effect . . . [they were]
coerced into foregoing their right to marry."" The Court further
held that "even those who can be persuaded to meet the statute's
requirements suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of
choice in an area in which we have held such freedom to be
39. 434 U.S. at 387 (emphasis added).
40. 576 F.2d at 901.
41. The class consisted of all noncustodial fathers with delinquent child support
payments.
42. 434 U.S. at 387.
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f ~ n d a m e n t a l . " ~ T hMapes
e
court itself explicitly recognized that
the tax rate structure could represent such an intrusion: "[T]he
elevated tax burden might in fact dissuade some couples from
entering into matrimony, [although it] does not present an insuperable barrier to marriage."44
The conclusion that Zablocki and Jobst require the obstacle
to marriage to be direct has some support. In Zablocki plaintiff
was required to appear before a court, which determined whether
he had met the requirements for marriage. If the court found that
he had not, it could absolutely prevent him from marrying. The
statute in Jobst, on the other hand, would not absolutely prevent
anyone from marrying. It would only result in a receipt of fewer
Social Security benefits should one decide to marry. It remains
unclear whether this distinction will preclude the finding of a
violation of the right to marry in all cases where a party either
loses benefits or is required to undertake additional obligations
only after the marriage has taken place.
A liberal reading of Zablocki would undoubtedly find the
marriage penalty unconstitutional. The facts in Zablocki were
such that the right to marry was directly affected by the statute,
but the language quoted earlier, stating that those who meet the
requirements and actually do marry also suffer a violation of their
fundamental rights, indicates that the Zablocki reasoning is
much broader than the facts there warrant. The marriage penalty
could coerce an individual into foregoing his right to marry, an
effect that Zablocki found constitutionally impermissible.
The Johnson court's finding of an infringement upon the
plaintiffs' fundamental right to marry45appears correct, since
nearly any definition of a significant interference would include
a potential cost of thousands of dollars per year. It remains unclear, however, how the courts will actually deal with this situation.
43. Id.
44. 576 F.2d a t 901.
45. 422 F. Supp. a t 973. The court called the infringement a "constitutionally significant burden." Id. This appears to be consistent with the "significant interference" language of Zablocki.
It is questionable whether the Johnson court actually did find an infringement upon
the fundamental right to marry, because they merely "assumed" such a n interference
existed due to the availability of an overriding compelling state interest. The court of
appeals merely affirmed the district court's decision without commenting on the standard
of review. Barter v. United States, 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977). At least one decision
has cited Johnson for its finding of an infringement of the right to marry and the resulting
application of strict scrutiny. See Jansen v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 20 (D. Minn.
1977).
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Even if the Mapes court was correct in its failure to find a
violation of the right to marry, it failed to deal with the fact that,
by requiring some married couples to pay additonal taxes because
they are married, the statutory scheme encourages them to obtain
a divorce. The question then raised is whether the existence of a
tax penalty levied on those couples who choose to remain married
constitutes, in the words of Justice Douglas, "a maximum destructive impact" upon the marriage relationship. Griswold was
originally interpreted by the courts as preserving sanctity of the
marriage bed, and it is unclear whether it would be extended to
this type of interference with the marital relationship. A broad
reading of Griswold could invalidate this statutory scheme. Justice Douglas believed that the statute banning contraceptives
indirectly destroyed the marital relationship. The tax rate structure does even more-it operates directly on the marriage, forcing
those who cannot or will not pay the additional tax to sever their
marital ties.
2.

The compelling state interest test

If the infringement of the right to marry can be found, the
strict scrutiny test is applicable and the government may impose
the marriage penalty only if it can demonstrate that it has a
"compelling state interest" in maintaining the tax rate structure
in its present form. The compelling state interest test was defined
in Dunn u. B l u m ~ t e i nin~ ~the following manner:
[State laws subject to strict scrutiny] are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are "necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest.". . . [A] heavy
burden of justification is on the State, and . . . the statute will
be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purposes.
. . . [Tlhe State cannot choose means that unnecessarily
burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity. . . . [I]f
there are other, reasonable ways to achieve [the State's] goals
with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a
State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts
at all, it must choose "less drastic means."47

Three requirements can be gleaned from the preceding definition, which must be met before the compelling state interest
46. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
47. Id. at 342-43. See also Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U S . 618, 634 (1969).
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test can be satisfied. First, the government must show that its
purpose or interest in passing the legislation is constitutionally
permis~ible.~~
Second, the governmental interest must be shown
to be sufficiently substantial." Third, the means used by the
government must be necessary to achieve the desired purpose,
that is, no alternatives can exist that would intrude to a lesser
degree upon the rights of the parties involved and that would still
allow the government to achieve its purpose." The government
concededly bears an extremely heavy burden in attempting to
48. A state may legitimately assert that the purpose of a statute requiring race to be
taken into account in its college admissions program was to maintain a diverse student
body. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). It may assert that its
purpose in passing legislation requiring illegitimate children to meet certain standards of
proof before being permitted to inherit from their fathers was to establish an orderly
method of property disposition and to prevent unnecessary delay in estate administration.
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). A state purpose of inhibiting migration by needy
persons into the state by requiring them to serve a fixed term of residency before receiving
welfare payments, however, is not legitimate. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Likewise, a "bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973). Furthermore, racial classifications are per se impermissible, regardless of the justification offered by the state. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Classifications based on alienage are sometimes given the same treatment. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). But cf. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (Congress may
condition alien's elgibility for Medicare on five-year continuous residence in United
States).
49. Traditionally, administrative convenience has not been considered compelling.
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Frontier0 v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). A state's interest in protecting the health of a
mother by preventing her from obtaining an abortion was found to be not substantial
enough to overcome her fundamental right of privacy, a t least during the first trimester
of pregnancy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Similarly, a legitimate state interest of
reducing the work load on probate courts by allowing only men to be appointed as estate
administrators was declared insubstantial. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
50. A state may not establish strict racial quotas for minorities in administering its
college admissions program even though it is doing so in an attempt to further the legitimate state goal of attaining a diverse student body. By simply taking race into account
along with other factors and thereby refraining from establishing rigid quotas, the state
may still attain the desired ends and do so in a way that is not constitutionally flawed.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Similarly, a state cannot
completely bar an illegitimate child from inheriting from his father when it may just as
easily achieve its goal by requiring a stricter evidentiary standard for illegitimate as
opposed to legitimate children. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Furthermore, a
classification is not necessary for the achievement of a state purpose where the classification and purpose bear an insufficient relationship to each other, i.e., where the means and
ends do not achieve a sufficiently close fit. A statute that permitted only property taxpayers to vote in a school board election was found to be insufficient to achieve an asserted
state purpose of limiting the voting to those who were "primarily interested" in such
elections. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). See also City of Phoenix
v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 402 (1979); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
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pass this test. According to Justice Burger, "[s]o far as I am
aware, no state law has ever satisfied [the compelling state interest test], and I doubt one ever will . . . ."51
The government asserted in Johnson that three state interests are served by the present tax provisions: first, the need to
raise revenue; second, the need to treat married couples with
equal incomes equally; and third, the need to reduce the taxes
levied on single persons so that they never exceed 120% of the tax
on married couples with equivalent incomes. All three of these
legislative goals are concededly constitutionally permissible, and
in light of the extreme deference usually given to taxing
schemes," it can be argued that these purposes are compelling."
Therefore, the issue is whether the taxing scheme complies with
the third requirement of the test-the present statutory scheme
must be necessary to satisfy the proposed state interests and no
less intrusive means of attaining those interests can exist.
The Johnson court held that because the statute in question
involved taxation, the usual requirement of ascertaining whether
a less restrictive alternative exists was not applicable, stating
that "the tax system is an 'arena in which no perfect alternatives
exist'. . . . [Tlhis court cannot require the Government to demonstrate more convincingly than it has that no less burdensome
means exist. To do so would be effectively to abrogate the constitutional taxing power of Congress."" The court went on to state
that "this court finds itself ill-equipped to judge the merits of
plaintiffs' suggestions or of the many others which might be offered. . . . The process of evaluating specific tax proposals and
of weighing their relative discriminatory impacts is primarily a
legislative, not a judicial, f ~ n c t i o n . " ~ ~
The court cited two cases in support of this proposition-San
Antonio Independent School District u. RodrigueP and
51. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodgriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
53. An argument could certainly be made to the contrary. This Comment, however,
will not attempt to do so. In the government's favor is the extreme deference usually given
to taxing statutes. On the taxpayer's side is the violation of his fundamental rights. The
court must necessarily balance these competing interests and determine which is more
substantial. The Johnson court found the scales to be tipped in favor of the government.
The necessity aspect of the compelling state interest test, however, is much more objective
in nature and will encompass the remainder of this subsection.
54. 422 F. Supp. a t 974.
55. Id.
56. 411 U S . 1 (1973).
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Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad .57 Neither case supports the
decision in Johnson. S u n Antonio was a class action brought on
behalf of school children who resided in school districts having
low property tax bases. The suit challenged a Texas school financing scheme that relied on local property taxation to determine the level of per-pupil expenditures in the districts. The
plaintiffs maintained that this system favored the more affluent
by providing more funds per pupil to the districts that had a
higher value of assessable property, allegedly providing those
pupils with a better education.
S a n Antonio is distinguishable from Johnson because the
San Antonio Court declined to find the existence of a fundamental right, and applied the rational basis test. As stated in S u n
Antonio, "[olnly where state action impinges on the exercise of
fundamental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found to
have chosen the least restrictive a l t e r n a t i ~ e . "Brushaber
was
~~
also decided under the rational basis test, and it contained no less
restrictive alternatives analysis. Brushaber is far afield from the
proposition for which Johnson cites it. Brushaber states that the
due process clause can never be a limitation on the taxing power
of Congress because, if it were, the Constitution would conflict
with itself. This absurd view, if accepted, would mean that Congress could levy a tax on all black persons merely because they
are black. Moreover, Brushaber was decided in 1916, not in 1976
as cited in Johnson.
Thus, no support exists for the proposition that the less intrusive alternatives analysis is inapplicable merely because the
statute being subjected to strict scrutiny involves taxation. In
fact, it can be inferred from dicta in San Antonio that the opposite is true?
In applying the less restrictive alternatives analysis, if an
alternative to the present statute exists that accomplishes the
same purposes for which the statute was originally intended, but
with a less intrusive impact upon fundamental constitutional values, the attacked statute must fall. Such alternatives may easily
be formulated with respect to the present tax rate structure. A
detailed analysis of one such formulation appears in Section IV.
This proposed rate structure entirely eliminates all constitutional
defects.
-

57. 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
58. 411 U.S. at 51.
59. Id.
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B. Irrebutta ble Presumption Analysis
One other constitutional argument was offered in both
Johnson and Mapes-that the statute in question creates a presumption that may not be rebutted by a proffer of evidence and
is not universally true, and thus violates the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. This argument is known as the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine and is based on Hoeper u. Tax
Commission of W i ~ c o n s i na, ~1931 Supreme Court decision.
In Hoeper a Wisconsin taxing statute requiring married couples to aggregate their incomes for the purpose of computing their
state income taxes was successfully challenged. Because the tax
rate schedules were progressive, the amount of tax due as a result
of the aggregation of income was always higher than the amount
that would have been due had each spouse computed the tax
separately, based on individual income. Although the statute allowed couples to file either jointly or separately, the aggregation
of income was required in either case.
The Court held the statute violative of due process, stating:
We have no doubt that, because of the fundamental conceptions
which underlie our system, any attempt by a state to measure
the tax on one person's property or income by reference to the
property or income of another is contrary to due process of law
as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. That which is not
in fact the taxpayer's income cannot be made such by calling it
income.61

The courts in both Johnson and Mapes questioned Hoeper as
good law and distinguished it on its facts, claiming that the statute in Hoeper was different from the federal tax statute and that
the Hoeper rule was therefore not applicable because of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Weinberger v. Salfi.62The
Johnson court was probably correct in questioning Hoeper as
good law. Weinberger arguably laid the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine to rest.63But to the extent Weinberger did not overrule
60. 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
61. Id. at 215.
62. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
63. Hoeper was decided in 1931, at a time when the irrebuttable presumption doctrine was flourishing. The Court determined that by permitting an individual to be taxed
on income earned by his spouse, the statute created an irrebuttable presumption of control
by one spouse over the other's property, which was not the case in many instances. Hoeper
cited Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926), the leading case at that time on
irrebuttable presumption, and was itself cited in numerous subsequent irrebutable presumption cases. See, e . g , Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85, 92
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Hoeper, the Johnson court's treatment of Hoeper and the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is questionable.
The Johnson court maintained that the provision in the Wisconsin statute that violated the fourteenth amendment was the
requirement that the income of both spouses be aggregated for
computation of the tax, irrespective of whether joint or separate
returns were filed. The court distinguished the present federal tax
statute because it does not contain a similar provision. This distinction is not entirely correct.
The constitutional flaw in Hoeper may not have been the
income aggregattion requirement per se. The Wisconsin statute
allowed for the filing of separate returns, provided that both
spouses' incomes were aggregated for the computation of the tax.
The statute required the tax be "paid by each in the proportion
that the average income of each [bore] to the combined average
(1935); Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172,178 (1933); Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436,
444 (1933); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, 142 (1932). But see Fernandez v. Wiener,
326 U.S. 340, 365-66 (1945).
Not long after Hoeper, the doctrine fell into a long period of disuse but has recently
emerged, much to the dismay of Justices Burger and Rehnquist. The formal reemergence
came in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), where a statute requiring
a pregnant teacher to take a maternity leave beginning five months prior to her expected
date of delivery was found to be an impermissible presumption that all pregnant women
who are within five months of delivery are unfit to teach. Since LaFleur other decisions
have relied on the irrebuttable presumption doctrine to invalidate various statutes. See
Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441
(1973); Kellems v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 556, 560 (1972). But see Mourning v. Family
Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
Weinberger, however, has inspired some serious doubts as to whether the doctrine
retains any vitality. The Weinberger Court was faced with determining the constitutionality of a Social Security provision that prevented surviving spouses and stepchildren of
deceased wage-earners from receiving any Social Security survivorship benefits on the
death of the wage-earner, where the marriage between the wage-earner and the surviving
spouse took place within nine months of the wage-earner's death. The district court had
concluded that '"the requirement constitutes a presumption that marriages like Mrs.
Salfi's, which did not precede the wage-earner's death by a t least nine months, were
entered into for the purpose of securing Social Security benefits,"' id. a t 767-68 (quoting
Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1974)), found such presumption
conclusive and, citing Cleveland Rd. of Educ., declared the provision unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. and the other
cases cited by the district court, on the ground that each of the cases cited involved a
"constitutionally protected status." The Court stated that the situation before the Court
in Weinberger was simply a constitutional challenge to social welfare legislation and
should be governed by cases such as Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), which
require only that a n extremely deferential standard of review be applied. Weinberger
unquestionably dealt a severe blow to the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, and it is
doubtful whether any constitutional challenge based on the doctrine would prevail if
brought before the present Supreme Court.
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income."64Therefore, each spouse paid a tax on his own income,
but because the tax was computed on the combined income of
both spouses and then allocated, the tax was higher than it would
have been had each spouse been allowed to compute the tax
individually.
The constitutional flaw in the statute, therefore, was arguably not the actual aggregation of incomes but the effect the aggregation had. If the Wisconsin taxing scheme had not called for
graduated tax rates, the statute would not have violated the Constitution because the tax due would have been the same whether
computed on each spouse's individual income or on the aggregate
incomes of both spouses.
The federal statutory scheme has the same effect as did the
invalidated Wisconsin law. Under federal law, a married couple
may either file a joint return, aggregating their incomes for the
purpose of computing the tax, or they may file separately, computing the tax on their individual incomes. The only distinction
between the federal and Wisconsin statute is that when a married
couple in Wisconsin decided to file separate returns, they were
required to aggregate their incomes for computation of the tax,
whereas present federal law contains no explicit aggregation requirement. Nevertheless, the effect under either statute is to require the couple to pay more tax.
Under federal law, the couple may choose not to aggregate
their incomes, but if they so choose, the amount of tax they pay
will be at least as much and in most cases more than they would
pay should they choose to aggregate. This is arguably no choice
at all. The federal statute, in effect, is exerting economic pressure
on married couples to aggregate their incomes and pay a tax
higher than they would pay if they were single. This was held
unconstitutional in Hoeper.

IV. A PROPOSAL
FOR REFORM
Since 1969 various proposals have been offered in an attempt
to reform the tax rate structure and to eliminate the marriage
penalty. The proposal most commonly mentioned has been
drafted into a bill which is currently awaiting subcommittee
hearings in both the Senate and the House of representative^.^"
-

64. 284 U.S. at 213.
65. S. 336, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.REC. S1057 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1979)
(introduced by Sen. Mathias); H.R. 3609, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.REC.El711
.(daily ed. Apr. 10, 1979) (introduction of a bill by Rep. Fenwick). See also 1972 Hearings,
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This proposed bill would allow married couples who choose
to file separate returns to use the rate table for single persons,
rather than the less advantageous rate table for married persons
filing separately. This procedure would effectively eliminate the
marriage penalty,"" but would create many problems of its own.
According to one author,
[tlhe enactment of a single rate schedule for all taxpayers,
regardless of their marital status, . . . [or, alternatively, allowing married couples to use the rate table for single taxpayers if
they so choose], would mean (a) unequal tax burdens for many
equal-income married couples . . . ; (b) restoration of the tax
advantages of residence in community property states-or, as a
device to eliminate these advantages, the development of rules
attributing community income to one spouse rather than
equally to both; and (c) revival of the problem of income splitting between spouses, a subject that has been virtually quiescent since 1948 . . . .67

A better proposal is available that would eliminate the marriage penalty, correct the constitutional flaws of the present rate
structure, and avoid the creation of new problems. This proposal,
suggested by several authors,68is called the "dual-rate system."
Under this system, one rate schedule would be used for single
taxpayers and for married couples filing joint returns. A different
rate schedule would be applicable to married couples who file
separately. The rates in the latter schedule would be set a t twice
the rates in the former schedule for each income level, thus neutralizing the effect of income-splittingF' All taxpayers with equal
incomes would pay the same rate of tax regardless of marital
status or residence in a community property state. Further, if
Congress desired to retain the policy that married couples should
pay less tax than single individuals with the same income, it
could establish a tax credit for married couples.
The major contribution made by this plan would be the elimination of the constitutional flaws of the present rate structure.
Because the marriage penalty would no longer exist, claims that
supra note 3, at 63 (statement of Albert H. Turkus, Associate, Tax Reform Research
Group; accompanied by Thomas H. Stanton, Director).
66. But see note 9 and accompanying test supra.
67. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, '27 STAN. L. REV.1389, 1442
(1975).
68. See, e.g., Betz, Federal Income Tax Discrimination Between Married and Single
J.L. REF.667, 688 n.154 (1974).
Taxpayers, 7 U . MICH.
69. Id. at 689. For a detailed example of this system, see id. 689 n.155.
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the tax rate structure infringes upon the right to marry could no
longer be made.'O Further, the three state interests advanced by
the government in favor of the changes made in the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 would be satisfied.
First, the need to raise revenue would be met because Congress could set the new rate table a t the level needed to raise the
desired amount of revenue. Second, the need to treat married
couples with equal incomes equally would be satisfied because
everyone with the same income would pay the same amount of
tax, and all married couples would be allowed the same amount
of credit. Finally, the need to reduce taxes on single persons so
that they never exceed 120% of the tax on married couples with
equivalent incomes would be met.
Moreover, this proposal will avoid the resurgence of the old
problems that have plagued Congress over the years. One problem creating much concern is the potential of income-splitting in
community property states. This was eliminated in 1948 with the
advent of the joint return, but many critics feel that reform such
as that suggested in the proposal before the Congress would cause
its return." The proposal supported by this Comment, however,
would not do so. If a married couple in a community property
state would decide to split their incomes and file separate returns,
they would pay the same total tax as if they had filed a joint
return, because the rates for married persons filing separately
would be twice the rates for joint returns a t the same income
levels. Thus, a married couple could achieve no tax advantage by
income-splitting under the dual-rate system.

-

The marriage penalty, notwithstanding its inadvertent enactment to assist a certain class of taxpayers, is infringing upon
the constitutional rights of a substantial number of Americans.
In light of the extreme deference given to federal tax statutes, the
courts may never vindicate the rights of these affected taxpayers.
The current legislative proposals designed to eliminate the marriage penalty would create so many additional problems that
their enactment is unlikely.
70. However, to totally eliminate the marriage penalty, certain minor changes will
need to be made in the standard deduction and general tax credit provisions of the Code.
See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
7 1 . See, e.g., 422 F . Supp. at 974.
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An alternative is available that would eliminate the current
problems with the rate structure; it would also be easy to implement. Congress should enact this alternative now.

James L. Musselman

